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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The freedom of parties to agree to arbitrate their disputes is enshrined by 
contract law and federal law.1  By inserting a mandatory arbitration clause in 
a contract, both parties agree that, should a dispute arise between them, they 
                                                 
 * B.A. Saint Anselm College, 2010; J.D., University of New Hampshire School of Law, 2013.  I 
would like to take the opportunity to thank Uillame Bell and Carroll Dortch for their insightful comments 
and careful editing, which were essential to the writing of this Note. 
 1. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing 
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such 
contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable .  .  .  .”); see also Southland Corp. 
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (“In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal 
courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements.”).   
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will not bring the matter to court.2  Instead, they agree to submit any disputes 
to a mutually-agreed-to third party, such as the American Arbitration 
Association; this third-party acts like a judge and resolves the dispute.3  
Arbitration has many advantages, such as reducing the cost and increasing 
the efficiency of dispute resolution.4  Because of these reduced costs and 
greater efficiency5, businesses can pass along their savings to consumers by 
offering them lower prices and more value.  
Notwithstanding all of these advantages, the freedom of parties to insert 
enforceable arbitration clauses in their contracts has its fair share of 
detractors.6  Big businesses often insert such clauses in take-it-or-leave-it 
consumer contracts, such as credit card and cell phone agreements.7  
Consumers who want or need the service provided by these businesses are 
forced to agree to mandatory arbitration clauses, which grant to both parties 
the legal right to insist upon arbitration as the sole dispute resolution 
method.8  While almost no one disagrees that arbitration is efficient and less 
costly, some argue that it is an unfair process.9  Since the business party 
usually appears before the third-party arbitrator repeatedly, whereas the 
consumer appears before him only once, the arbitrator may feel inclined to 
find in favor of the business party, its repeat customer.10 
This debate between efficiency and the unfairness underlies any 
discussion about arbitration.11  This note will address this debate by 
analyzing merely one facet of arbitration: arbitration waiver.12  All of the 
circuits agree that when a party with a contractual right to arbitrate chooses 
to litigate a dispute, the party’s election to litigate may waive his ability to 
move the case out of court and into arbitration.13  However, they disagree 
about what test should be applied to decide whether a particular election to 
litigate constitutes arbitration waiver.14  The circuits have formulated 
                                                 
 2. Arbitration, U.S. SEC. & EXCH COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/arbproc.htm (last visited 
April 1, 2012).  
 3. Id.; see also About American Arbitration Association, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/s/about (last visited April 1, 2012).  
 4. Jane Spencer, Signing Away Your Right to Sue, THE WALL ST. J. (Oct. 01, 2003), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB106495674838886400.html. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Editorial: Beware the Fine Print, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/27/opinion/27sun2.html.  
 7. Id.  
 8. Id.  
 9. Id.  
 10. See id. 
 11. Editorial, supra note 6; Spencer, supra note 4.  
 12. E.g., Erdman Co. v. Phoenix Land & Acquisition, LLC, 650 F.3d 1115, 1117 (8th Cir. 2011); 
Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1995); Carcich v. Rederi 
A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 13. E.g., Erdman, 650 F.3d at 1117; Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 390; Carcich, 389 F.2d at 696.  
 14. See Erdman, 650 F.3d at 1118–19 (“There is a circuit split over whether the party asserting waiver 
must show prejudice.”).  
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primarily two different tests.15  In the majority of circuits, two elements must 
be proven:  (1) the party seeking arbitration must have participated in 
litigation; and (2) the party resisting arbitration must show that he will suffer 
prejudice.16  A minority of circuits keep the first element, but the prejudice 
requirement has been eliminated.17  
A discussion of this circuit split is timely because the U.S. Supreme 
Court, in 2011, expressed its desire to resolve the split by granting 
certiorari in an arbitration waiver case.18  Although the case was dismissed 
later that same year,19 it appears clear that arbitration waiver is an issue the 
Court may seek to take up in the future.  
Before we begin an examination of arbitration waiver, notice that there 
are two competing policies underlying it.  On the one hand, if the courts 
make it too easy to waive an arbitration provision, they risk undermining the 
bargained-for contractual term, the enforcement of which may lead to greater 
efficiency of dispute resolution20 and the resulting benefits to consumers, like 
lower prices.  On the other hand, if the courts make it too difficult to waive 
an arbitration provision, they risk allowing for abuse: litigants will be able to 
go to court at first and then assert their contractual right to move the case to 
arbitration21 when litigation turns against them.22  The Seventh Circuit has 
aptly named this abuse a game of “heads I win, tails you lose.”23   
This note seeks to prove that the majority test, which requires prejudice, 
should be adopted by all of the circuits.24  In order to prove this, this note will 
first discuss the Federal Arbitration Act, a law that requires that arbitration 
clauses be placed on the same footing as other contractual terms.25  Second, 
this note will examine the majority and minority approaches to arbitration 
waiver.26  Finally, this note will show that the majority approach is preferable 
because only this approach places arbitration clauses on the same footing as 
other contractual terms.27  
                                                 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. at 1117.   
 17. E.g., St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc. v. Disco Aluminum Prods. Co., 969 F.2d 585, 590 
(7th Cir. 1992) (“While none of our cases has stated explicitly that a court may find waiver absent 
prejudice, that principle is implicit in our repeated emphasis that waiver depends on all the circumstances 
in a particular case rather than on any rigid rules and that prejudice is but one relevant circumstance to 
consider in determining whether a party has waived its right to arbitrate.”).  
 18. Citibank, N.A. v. Stok & Assocs., P.A., 387 F. App'x 921 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 79 
U.S.L.W. 3475 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2011).  
 19. Citibank, N.A., 387 F. App'x 921, cert. dismissed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3686 (U.S. June 2, 2011). 
 20. Spencer, supra note 4. 
 21. Procedurally, a case is moved to arbitration by the filing of a motion to stay the matter, pending 
arbitration.  See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 400 (1967).  
 22. Spencer, supra note 4. 
 23. Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 24. See infra Part IV.  
 25. See infra Part II.A–B.  
 26. See infra Part II.C–E; see also infra Part III. 
 27. See infra Parts IV–V.  
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II.  BACKGROUND 
 
A. The Federal Arbitration Act  
 
Despite the criticism that arbitration receives today, it is nothing like the 
hostility that arbitration received in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.28  
In the words of Congress, English common law courts were jealous “for their 
own jurisdiction . . . .  This jealousy survived for so lon[g] a period that the 
principle became firmly embedded in the English common law and was 
adopted with it by the American courts.  The courts have felt that the 
precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative 
enactment . . . .”29  This common law precedent meant that, although two 
parties may include an arbitration term in their contract, courts were free to, 
and often did, ignore such terms to allow a controversy to proceed in court.30  
American courts adopted this anti-arbitration bias.31  Thus, for much of 
American history, arbitration clauses were not placed on the same footing as 
other contract clauses.32  
However, this common law precedent began to receive great scrutiny.33  
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the United States rapidly 
industrialized.34  This industrialization increased the number of business 
disputes, and businesses realized that they needed a way to resolve disputes 
out of court that was more efficient.35  Nevertheless, the courts remained 
obstinate, maintaining the common law bias of ignoring arbitration 
agreements and hearing all disputes.36  
Therefore, businesses sought the help of legislatures to force courts to 
enforce arbitration agreements.37  First, they lobbied states for laws that 
                                                 
 28. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 
(1924)).  
 29. Id.; see also Preston Douglas Wigner, The United States Supreme Court’s Expansive Approach to 
the Federal Arbitration Act: A Look at the Past, Present, and Future of Section 2, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 
1499, 1502 (1995).  He observes that the English courts originally adopted this anti-arbitration rule 
because of an economic incentive.  Id.  For each decision rendered, the English courts earned a fee.  Id.  
To enforce an arbitration agreement would deprive them of this fee.   Id.  Although this incentive was no 
longer driving American courts, they still kept the anti-arbitration rule, with minimal justification for it.  
Id.   
 30. Southland, 465 U.S. at 13 (citing Hearing on S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 6 (1923) (remarks of Sen. Walsh)) (“The Arbitration Act sought to 
‘overcome the rule of equity, that equity will not specifically enforce any arbitration agreement.’”).   
 31. Wigner, supra note 29, at 1502.    
 32. Id.     
 33. Id.     
 34. Id.     
 35. Id.     
 36. Id.     
 37. Wigner, supra note 29, at 1503.  
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would protect arbitration agreements and won several victories at that level.38  
Then, they lobbied Congress.39  
In 1925, their lobbying efforts succeeded.40 Congress enacted the Federal 
Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which provided that “a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy . . . 
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist 
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”41  In enacting the 
FAA, Congress clearly meant to overturn the common law precedent against 
arbitration.42  For the FAA to apply to a transaction, the transaction need only 
be contained in a “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.”43  
The Court has noted that the transaction involving commerce requirement is 
not difficult to meet, and it rarely bars the application of the FAA.44  
Furthermore, in order to ensure that these agreements are enforced, 
Section 3 of the FAA directs that all “courts of the United States” must grant 
a motion to stay litigation, pending arbitration, if the court determines that 
the contract requires the matter to be arbitrated.45  Before the Southland 
decision discussed below, many commentators pointed out that the phrase 
“courts of the United States” suggested that Section 3 was only applicable to 
federal courts and not to state courts.46  According to this view, the FAA was 
merely a procedural law passed to control the federal courts.47    
On the other hand, others have pointed to Section 2’s reference to “a 
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce,” noting that this 
phrase suggests that Congress was invoking its commerce clause power in 
passing the FAA.48  Under this view, the FAA would apply to both the states 
and the federal courts as substantive law.49  A review of the legislative 
history of the FAA provided no answers to this debate.50  Thus, this debate 
was left largely unsettled until the Southland case, discussed below.51  
                                                 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 42. Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Court’s Erroneous Statutory 
Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and A Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 799 (2002). 
 43. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 44. Jon R. Schumacher, The Reach of the Federal Arbitration Act: Implications On State Procedural 
Law, 70 N.D. L. REV. 459, 462–63 (1994) (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 
U.S. 395, 401 n.7).  
 45. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012); Id. at 463.  
 46. Schumacher, supra note 44, at 463.  
 47. Id. at 463–65.  
 48. Id. at 464–65.   
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 461 n.25 (providing a good discussion of the FAA’s perplexing legislative history.  In a 
House Report, Congress stated that “[t]he purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforcible [sic] 
agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involving interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction 
or [sic] admiralty, or which may be the subject of litigation in the Federal courts.”).  
 51. See id. at 464–65.  
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B. Expansive interpretation of the FAA  
 
In Southland Corp. v. Keating, franchisees of certain 7-Eleven stores 
sued their franchisor, the Southland Corporation (“Southland”), in California 
Superior Court.52  Southland’s agreement with its franchisees contained an 
arbitration clause.53  Based on that clause, it moved to stay the proceedings 
pending arbitration.54  The Superior Court granted the motion to stay on all 
claims except those covered by a California statute, the Franchise Investment 
Law (“FIL”).55  As interpreted by the California Supreme Court, claims 
brought under the FIL must be brought to a judicial forum and may not be 
arbitrated.56 
Southland appealed, and the case eventually reached the U.S. Supreme 
Court.57  The Court found that the FIL was in direct conflict with the FAA 
because the FAA required the enforcement of arbitration clauses and the FIL 
attempted to prevent the enforcement of these clauses in certain cases.58  
Because of this direct conflict between state and federal law, the FIL was 
preempted.59 
However, before the Court’s decision, remember that it was an open 
question whether the FAA applied to a case like Southland at all, which was 
initiated in state court.60  In fact, certain members of the Court believed that 
the FAA only applied to federal courts and that the preemption of the FIL 
would only apply if the case were brought in federal court.61  Therefore, 
because Southland was brought in state court, some on the Court believed 
that the California statute requiring judicial resolution of claims could be 
given effect.62  
The majority, however, rejected this interpretation, holding that the FAA 
was substantive law applicable to both state and federal courts.63  Because 
the FAA applied to both state and federal courts, it preempted the FIL’s 
                                                 
 52. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 3–5 (1984).  
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 4. 
 55. Id. at 4–5.  
 56. Id.   
 57. Id. at 5.  
 58. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10. 
 59. Id.  But see id. at 18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that “it is by no means clear that Congress 
intended entirely to displace State authority in this field.”).  
 60. Schumacher, supra note 44, at 463.  
 61. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 26 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (observing that the American Bar 
Association Committee that lobbied for enactment of the FAA stated “the statute establishes a procedure 
in the Federal courts for the enforcement of arbitration agreements . . . .”). 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. at 12.  
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attempt to prevent the enforcement of arbitration clauses, even though the 
franchisees sued in California state court.64  
In reaching its decision that broadly construed the arbitration right, the 
Court articulated that the purpose of the FAA was to ensure that the 
arbitration right was placed on the same footing as any other contract right.65  
The same footing policy is important in analyzing the scope of various 
aspects of the arbitration right, including arbitration waiver.66  Therefore, 
when this note examines the two approaches to waiver, it will consider which 
approach places the arbitration right on the same footing as all other contract 
rights.67  This note will conclude that the approach that places the arbitration 
right on the same footing is the proper approach consistent with the FAA, as 
interpreted by the Court in Southland.68 
 
C. Arbitration Waiver  
 
Section 2 of the FAA provides that “a contract . . . to settle by arbitration 
a controversy . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”69  
Arbitration waiver is one of the those grounds.70  If a party who has a right to 
arbitrate under his contract waives that right, he must proceed in court and 
may not seek resolution of the matter in arbitration.71  
An arbitration term can be waived by participating in litigation.72  This 
type of waiver occurs when a party brings a case to court, notwithstanding an 
arbitration term in his contract.73 The participation by the party in a court 
proceeding may be conduct that reveals his intent to waive his contractual 
right to arbitrate.74 
                                                 
 64. Id. at 5, 10.  
 65. Id. at 16.  Some might argue that the Court meant to put the arbitration on a better footing than 
other contract rights based upon the  “national policy favoring arbitration” that it also enumerates in this 
case.  Id. at 10.  However, it is important to note that the “national policy favoring arbitration” exists 
merely to ensure “the enforcement of arbitration agreements.”  Id.   
 66. Southland, 465 U.S. at 16; see also Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 
388, 389–90 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing St. Mary’s Medical Center of Evansville, Inc. v. Disco Aluminum 
Prods. Co., 969 F.2d 585 (7th Cir.1992)) (suggesting that some courts improperly use the “federal policy 
favoring arbitration” to interpret arbitration clauses more favorably than other contract clauses. The courts 
should treat arbitration clauses “no less hospitably” than other contract clauses). 
 67. Southland, 465 U.S. at 16; Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 390. 
 68. 465 U.S. at 16.  
 69. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 70. Id.  
 71. Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. 
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Although the circuits all agree that a showing must be made that the 
movant75 participated in litigation, there is a circuit split as to whether any 
additional showing is necessary.76  The minority approach is that the non-
movant77 need only show that the movant participated in litigation.78  In 
contrast, the majority approach is that non-movant must show both that 1) the 
movant participated in litigation and that, from this participation in 
litigation, 2) he has suffered prejudice.79  This note will begin with an 
examination of the majority approach, which requires a showing that the 
non-movant has suffered prejudice.80  
 
D.  The Majority Approach 
 
1.  The participation element originates from the traditional waiver test    
 
Because Southland requires that arbitration be put on the same footing as 
all other contract terms, it is important to consider the traditional contract law 
test for waiver and compare it to the arbitration waiver test applied by the 
circuits.81  In contract law, waiver is defined as the (1) “intentional 
relinquishment” of a (2) “known right.”82  In the arbitration context, the 
second part of this definition, the knowledge requirement, is typically not 
included as a separate element in the arbitration waiver analysis83 because it 
is rarely difficult to prove; the movant is often the one who drafted the 
arbitration clause and thus has knowledge of his right to arbitrate.  
                                                 
 75. The movant is the party who seeks to bring the case, now being litigated in court, to arbitration. 
Thus, the movant files a motion to stay the case, pending arbitration.  
 76. See Erdman Co. v. Phoenix Land & Acquisition, LLC, 650 F.3d 1115, 1118–19 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(“There is a circuit split over whether the party asserting waiver must show prejudice.”).  
 77. The non-movant is the party who does not want the case, now in court, to be brought to arbitration. 
Thus, he opposes the movant’s motion to stay the case, pending arbitration.  
 78. The following three cases hold that prejudice is not a required element in the waiver analysis, 
although it may be considered as a factor.  Hill v. Ricoh Ams. Corp., 603 F.3d 766, 774–75 (10th Cir. 
2010); St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc. v. Disco Aluminum Prods. Co., 969 F.2d 585, 590 (7th 
Cir. 1992); Nat’l Found. for Cancer Research v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 821 F.2d 772, 777 (D.C. Cir. 
1987).  
 79. For cases applying the 2-part participation and prejudice test, see Citibank, N.A. v. Stok & Assocs., 
P.A., 387 F. App'x 921, 923 (11th Cir. 2010); Crossville Med. Oncology, P.C. v. Glenwood Sys., LLC, 
310 F. App’x 858, 859 (6th Cir. 2009); Forrester v. Penn Lyon Homes, Inc., 553 F.3d 340, 343 (4th Cir. 
2009); Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 222 (3d Cir. 2007); Walker v. J.C. Bradford & 
Co., 938 F.2d 575, 577 (5th Cir. 1991); Sweater Bee by Banff, Ltd. v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 754 F.2d 
457, 461 (2d Cir. 1985).  For cases applying the 3-part test, which includes a knowledge requirement, see 
Erdman, 650 F.3d at 1117; Fisher v. A.G. Becker Paribas Inc., 791 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1986).  For a 
case applying an alternative test, see Jones Motor Co. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local Union 
No. 633 of New Hampshire, 671 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 1982) (applying a 6-factor test). 
 80. E.g., Erdman, 650 F.3d at 1117 (applying the 3-part test).   
 81. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). 
 82. Ryder v. Bank of Hickory Hills, 146 Ill. 2d 98, 104 (1991).  
 83. See supra note 79 for cases that entirely omit the knowledge requirement from their arbitration 
waiver test and instead focus solely on participation and prejudice.  
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In contrast, the first part of this definition, the intent requirement, is 
embodied in the participation in litigation element of the arbitration waiver 
test.84  In essence, the movant’s participation in litigation is conduct that 
implies his intent to waive his arbitration right.85  
 
2. The origins of the prejudice element  
  
Intent and knowledge are the only elements required by the traditional 
contract law theory of waiver.86  However, in the majority of circuits, courts 
have added a third element, prejudice, to show arbitration waiver.87  This 
element is absent from the traditional contract law waiver test.88  Because of 
its absence from the traditional test, some have argued that it should be 
eliminated from the arbitration waiver test as well.89  Therefore, this note will 
examine the origin of the prejudice requirement in the arbitration context.   
Prejudice appears to originate from a Second Circuit case, Carcich v. 
Rederi A/B Nordie.90  In that case, longshoremen were injured while working 
on a ship.91  They sued the ship’s owners, and the owners then brought a 
third-party complaint against the shipping company, the Cunard Steamship 
Company (“Cunard”).92  On July 15, 1964, Cunard answered the complaint, 
arguing that the case should be arbitrated pursuant to a term in their 
contract.93  However, Cunard did not officially move to stay the case pending 
arbitration until November 1966.94  The district court denied the motion, and 
Cunard appealed.95  
  The plaintiffs argued that Cunard, by taking over two years to move to 
stay the proceedings, waived its contractual right to arbitrate.96  However, the 
Second Circuit disagreed, finding that there was no waiver.97  Although the 
court admitted that taking two years was certainly an act inconsistent with 
the right to arbitrate, this “mere delay” was not enough.98  There needed to be 
                                                 
 84. Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 85. Id.; see also Ryder, 146 Ill. 2d at 105 (“Waiver may be made by an express agreement or it may be 
implied from the conduct of the party who is alleged to have waived a right.”) 
 86. Ryder, 146 Ill. 2d at 104. 
 87. E.g., Erdman Co. v. Phoenix Land & Acquisition, LLC, 650 F.3d 1115, 1117 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 88. Ryder, 146 Ill. 2d at 104. 
 89. See infra Part II.E; see also infra Part III. 
 90. Erdman, 650 F.3d at 1120 n.4 (“We can trace the origins of our prejudice requirement to Carcich v. 
Rederi A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir.1968).”).  
 91. Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d 692, 693–94 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 92. Id.   
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 696.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Carcich, 389 F.2d at 696. 
 98. Id. 
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some showing of prejudice to the plaintiffs, and that element was absent 
here.99  
In subsequent cases, the Second Circuit has explained that prejudice 
relates to some sort of “inherent unfairness—in terms of delay, expense, or 
damage to a party’s legal position—that occurs when the party’s opponent 
forces it to litigate an issue and later seeks to arbitrate that same issue.”100  
Thus, there are two parts to the prejudice analysis: (1) the delay and expense 
sub-element, and (2) the legal position sub-element.101  In Carcich, for 
example, the court observed that prejudice would have been found if the 
movant could be shown to have taken “unfair advantage of discovery 
proceedings which would not have been available to it in arbitration . . . .”102  
While the delay and expense sub-element was present, the legal position sub-
element was absent because the defendant had not availed himself of the 
mechanisms of discovery.103  Therefore, the court found that there was no 
prejudice to the plaintiffs, and Cunard could properly move the matter from 
litigation to arbitration.104 
The legal position sub-element of prejudice is a fact-specific inquiry, and 
several factors often lead to a finding of damage to one’s legal position, 
although none are conclusive.105  The factors include: (1) the use of 
depositions, (2) the filing of motions on the merits, and (3) the raising of 
“thirteen affirmative defenses.”106                                                                                                                       
Thus, the prejudice element, which focuses on the unfairness to the non-
movant resisting arbitration, has a long-standing history in arbitration law.107  
Nevertheless, in recent years, at least three circuits have begun to question 
the need for this element in the arbitration waiver test.108   
                                                 
 99. Id. 
 100. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Webster Auto Parts, Inc., 128 F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 101. Id.; see 3 Commercial Arbitration § 50:48 (2012) (“The true test of prejudice is not delay alone.  
Rather, the waiver of the right to arbitrate must be viewed both as to the length of time the court case has 
continued as well as the degree to which the party (who later proposes arbitration) has engaged the 
machinery of litigation.  This makes the assessment of prejudice a qualitative judgment as to the intensity 
of the litigation.”); see also Frye v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 877 F.2d 396, 399 (5th Cir. 
1989) (holding that “[b]oth delay[s] and the extent of the moving party’s participation in judicial 
proceedings” factor into a determination of prejudice). 
 102. 389 F.2d at 696.   
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885, 887–91 (2d Cir. 1985).   
 106. Id.; see S. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Medquist, Inc., 258 F. App’x 466, 467–68 (3d Cir. 2007) (ruling 
that contests over the merits of a case suggest prejudice but non-merit motion practice does not cause 
prejudice unless it is extensive);  see also Baker v. Conoco Pipeline Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1301 
(N.D. Okla. 2003) (finding that the movant’s use of “[l]imited interrogatories,” but not depositions, prior 
to moving to stay arbitration did not prejudice the non-movant). 
 107. Carcich, 389 F.2d at 696 (2d Cir. 1968); see Rush, 779 F.2d at 887 (citing Carcich, 389 F.2d at 
696); see also Erdman Co. 650 F.3d at 1120 n.4 (recognizing that Carcich, 389 F.2d at 696, was the origin 
of the prejudice element).  
 108. Hill, 603 F.3d at 772–73; St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc., 969 F.2d at 590–91; Nat’l 
Found. for Cancer Research, 821 F.2d at 777.  
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E. The Minority Approach  
 
Three circuits have chosen to eliminate prejudice as an element of 
arbitration waiver.109  Instead, they focus on the participation in litigation 
element that examines how a movant’s participation in litigation may reveal 
an intent to forfeit his or her right to move the case to arbitration.110  In 
discussing the minority approach, this note will analyze the Seventh Circuit’s 
arbitration waiver test, primarily because this circuit goes the furthest in 
eliminating almost all vestiges of prejudice from its waiver analysis.111  The 
Seventh Circuit reached its current waiver test through two cases.112  First, in 
St. Mary’s Medical Center of Evansville, Inc. v. Disco Aluminum Products 
Co., the Seventh Circuit turned prejudice from an element of arbitration 
waiver into a mere factor.113  Prejudice would remain part of the analysis, but 
a showing of prejudice was no longer required to prove arbitration waiver.114  
Second, three years later, in Cabinetree of Wisconsin, Inc. v. KraftMaid 
Cabinetry Inc., the Seventh Circuit did something even more revolutionary; 
in an opinion written by Chief Judge Posner, the Circuit almost completely 
eliminated the role of prejudice in the waiver analysis.115   
 
III.  INSTANT CASE 
 
A. Factual Background  
 
Cabinetree was a retailer of kitchen cabinets, sinks, faucets, and similar 
items.116  In 1989, it entered into a written agreement with KraftMaid, a 
manufacturer of cabinets, to purchase its products.117  In addition to their 
written contract, the parties also orally agreed that Cabinetree would be the 
exclusive retailer of KraftMaid products in the Milwaukee/Waukesha area.118  
For about two years, the relationship went well.119   
                                                 
 109. The following three cases hold that prejudice is not a required element in the waiver analysis, 
although it may be considered as a factor: Hill, 603 F.3d at 772–75; St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. of Evansville, 
Inc., 969 F.2d at 590; Nat’l Found. for Cancer Research, 821 F.2d at 777–78.  
 110. See St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc., 969 F.2d at 589 (“The district court could reasonably 
conclude from all of this that Disco acted inconsistently with any intent to assert its right to arbitrate”).   
 111. Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Today we 
take the next step in the evolution of doctrine, and hold that an election to proceed before a nonarbitral 
tribunal for the resolution of a contractual dispute is a presumptive waiver of the right to arbitrate.”).  
 112. Id.; St. Mary’s, 969 F.2d at 590. 
 113. 969 F.2d at 590. 
 114. Id.  
 115. Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 390–91. 
 116. Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 296, 297 (E.D. Wis. 1996) 
(hereinafter “Cabintree II”). 
 117. Id. at 297–98.  
 118. Id. at 297–99. 
 119. Id. at 299.   
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However, in 1992, things began to sour when KraftMaid started selling 
its products to two other retailers—Menards and Handy Andy—in the 
Milwaukee/Waukesha area.120  The competition from these two retailers 
caused a drop in Cabinetree’s sale of KraftMaid products.121  In response to 
this drop in sales, KraftMaid told Cabinetree that it would no longer sell its 
cabinets to Cabinetree on credit.122  
Cabinetree viewed the failure to extend credit as termination of a 
franchise relationship and the sale to other retailers in the 
Milwaukee/Waukesha area as a breach of an oral exclusivity agreement.123  
Cabinetree sued in Wisconsin state court on September 30, 1993.124  On 
November 4, 1993, KraftMaid removed the case to federal district court.125  
Then, on July 11, 1994, KraftMaid “dropped a bombshell into the 
proceedings” when it moved to stay the matter pending arbitration.126  The 
district court denied the motion, and KraftMaid appealed.127  
 
B. Holding and Reasoning 
  
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that KraftMaid had waived its 
contractual right to move to stay the case pending arbitration.128  In so 
finding, the court enumerated a new rule for arbitration waiver: “an election 
to proceed before a nonarbitral tribunal for the resolution of a contractual 
dispute is a presumptive waiver of the right to arbitrate.”129  Thus, the court 
focused the waiver inquiry solely on what the movant did or did not do; it 
eliminated almost any inquiry into the prejudice element.130  Because 
KraftMaid had removed the case to federal court without also moving to stay 
the case pending arbitration, it elected to forgo its right to assert the 
arbitration right.131  
The court found that this new rule was better founded in contract law.132  
In the court’s view, the prejudice element was not consistent with the 
                                                 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.   
 122. Cabinetree II, 914 F. Supp. at 299.  
 123. Id. at 297, 299. 
 124. Id. at 297. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 389; Cabinetree II, 914 F. Supp. at 297. 
 127. Cabinetree II, 914 F. Supp. at 297. 
 128. Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 391.  
 129. Id. at 390. 
 130. Id.  However, note that the court allowed for a very narrow exception where prejudice might apply.  
Id. at 391.  If the movant could establish that special circumstances existed, such as “doubts about 
arbitrability,” then the burden would shift to the movant to establish prejudice.  Id.  Nevertheless, absent a 
showing of special circumstances, this rule places the burden squarely on the party who wishes to uphold 
the contract.  Id.  
 131. Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 390.  
 132. Id.  
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traditional contract law waiver test, which focuses on intent.133  It explained 
that adding the prejudice element put the arbitration right on a better footing 
than all other contract rights, and the right to arbitrate should only be put on 
the same footing as all other contract rights.134 
According to the court, if the arbitration right is to be put on the same 
footing as all other contract terms, the intent-based waiver test must be 
used.135  The court found that intent could be implied from KraftMaid’s 
conduct.136  Because KraftMaid’s conduct of removing the case to federal 
court without moving to stay the case pending arbitration showed an intent to 
waive its arbitration right, the court held that Cabinetree presumptively 
waived its right to arbitrate.137 
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
A. A major flaw in the Cabinetree approach 
 
Although the Seventh Circuit’s presumptive waiver rule has gained some 
academic praise, this approach is flawed because it lacks any basis in 
contract law notions of waiver.138 
When examining contract law, one finds that it is nearly impossible for 
courts to imply waiver of a contract term based on conduct alone.139  One 
court stated that implied waiver only arises where there are “undisputed acts 
or language so inconsistent with a purpose to stand on the contract provisions 
as to leave no opportunity for a reasonable inference to the contrary.”140  A 
Texas court acknowledged the difficulty of proving implied waiver, stating 
that “without an admission of waiver by the opposite party, it is difficult to 
prove waiver as a matter of law.”141  
                                                 
 133. Id.; Ryder, 585 N.E.2d at 49. 
 134. Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 390–91.  
 135. Id.; Ryder, 585 N.E.2d at 104–05.  Once again, it is noted that the knowledge element is rarely an 
issue in arbitration waiver because the party asserting waiver is usually the party who drafted the 
arbitration clause.  See supra note 79 for cases that entirely omit the knowledge requirement from their 
arbitration waiver test and instead focus solely on participation and prejudice.   
 136. Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 390.  
 137. Id.  
138  Id.  For an example of an article favoring the adoption of the Cabinetree presumption in other 
circuits, see Zachary Kerner, Jung v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 179, 
188–89 (2009).  
 139. Cohen v. Independence Blue Cross, 820 F. Supp. 2d 594, 606 (D.N.J. 2011). 
 140. Id.; see also Sturbridge Home Builders, Inc. v. Downing Seaport, Inc., 890 A.2d 58, 65 (R.I. 2005) 
(“A waiver may be proved indirectly by facts and circumstances from which intention to waive may be 
clearly inferred.”) (citing 28 AM. JUR. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 225 (2000)).  It is also interesting to note 
that the Seventh Circuit, in applying Illinois law in a diversity case, restated this very same rule: an 
implied waiver must be “clearly inferable from the circumstances.”  Bank v. Truck Ins. Exch., 51 F.3d 
736, 739 (7th Cir. 1995).  
 141. RM Crowe Prop. Servs. Co., v. Strategic Energy, L.L.C., 348 S.W.3d 444, 449 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2011). 
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The reluctance of courts to imply waiver of a contractual term is at the 
very heart of contract law.142  A contract right is bargained for, and its terms 
represent the express intent of the parties.143  Even with contracts of 
adhesion, the parties have the opportunity to read the contract, and they 
manifest their express intent to be bound by entering into the agreement.144  
This express intent should not be lightly overturned through implied intent 
inferred from actions or inactions of questionable meaning.145   
In fact, the Seventh Circuit, the very same court that was willing to imply 
waiver in the arbitration context, has acknowledged the danger of implying 
waiver in another context.146  In a case involving an alleged breach of 
contract by an insurance company, the court discussed the “inherent 
implausibility of offers to prove ‘bare’ waiver in a contractual setting.”147  
The court noted that “[u]nless the right waived is a minor one . . . , why 
would someone give it up in exchange for nothing?”148 
It is clear that an arbitration clause represents the parties’ express intent 
to resolve any disputes between them by arbitration.149  Under a traditional 
contract law waiver theory, conduct may implicitly waive a contract right 
only if it clearly manifests an intent to forgo that right.150  A party’s 
participation in litigation, however, is not conduct that clearly manifests an 
intent to forgo the arbitration right because there are other reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from a party’s election to bring a case to 
court.151  As the Seventh Circuit itself noted, a party might not be certain if 
an issue is arbitrable.152  If that party arbitrates and then learns that the issue 
is not arbitrable, the statute of limitations might have passed, and the court 
might refuse to litigate the matter.153  Therefore, a party might bring a case to 
court merely with the intent of determining whether an issue may be 
arbitrated.154  Notice that the party’s intent to determine whether an issue 
may be arbitrated is not an intent to forgo the arbitration right.155   
Therefore, it may not properly be said that participation in litigation 
clearly manifests an intent to forgo arbitration.156  The minority approach is 
                                                 
 142. Bank, 51 F.3d at 739–40. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id.   
 148. Bank, 51 F.3d at 739–40. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Cohen, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 606.  
 151. Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390–91 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 152. Id.  
 153. See id. (acknowledging that there are a “variety of circumstances” that do not suggest an intention 
to forgo the arbitration right).  
 154. Id.   
 155. Id.  
 156. Id.  
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simply not grounded in contract law; an intent to forgo arbitration is not 
clearly inferable from a party’s participation in litigation.157  
 
B. The sound basis for the majority approach in traditional notions of 
estoppel   
 
The majority approach states that arbitration waiver requires both 
participation in litigation and prejudice.158  While the Seventh Circuit 
correctly noted that prejudice is absent from the traditional waiver test, it 
failed to consider whether another contract law theory might support the 
majority rule.159  If it had, the Seventh Circuit might have found justification 
for the majority rule in the theory of waiver by estoppel.160   
Under waiver by estoppel, a contract right is given up if the waiving 
party’s conduct causes the non-waiving party to be “misled to his or her 
prejudice by the conduct of the other party into the honest and reasonable 
belief that the other party was not insisting upon some right.”161  Unlike 
waiver, estoppel is a doctrine founded upon equity and fairness.162  It is not 
necessarily meant to give effect to the party’s intent.163  Instead, estoppel 
prevents injustice by prohibiting a party from “repudiat[ing] a course of 
action on which another party has relied to his detriment.”164 
The majority view on arbitration waiver should be adopted by all of the 
circuits because only this test is consistent with a traditional contract law 
theory—waiver by estoppel.165  As even proponents of the minority view 
recognize, arbitration waiver is about whether it is fair to subject the non-
moving party to arbitration when the movant has participated in litigation.166  
To answer this fairness inquiry, the majority view properly focuses on the 
question of prejudice, which asks whether the non-moving party has 
detrimentally relied on the moving party’s participation in litigation.167  By 
focusing on fairness and by assessing fairness in terms of detrimental 
                                                 
 157. Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 390–91.   
 158. E.g., Erdman Co., 650 F.3d at 1117.   
 159. See Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 390–91. 
 160. Id.; 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:29 (4th ed.).  
 161. 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:29 (4th ed.) (emphasis added); see also  Saverslak v. Davis-
Cleaver Produce Co., 606 F.2d 208, 213 (7th Cir. 1979) (“An estoppel . . . arises only when a party’s 
conduct misleads another to believe that a right will not be enforced and causes him to act to his detriment 
in reliance upon this belief.”).  
 162. Knorr v. Smeal, 836 A.2d 794, 799 (N.J. 2003). 
 163. Oakland Raiders v. Oakland-Alameda Cnty. Coliseum, Inc., 51 Cal. Rptr.3d 144, 153–54 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2006) (“While the question of waiver ordinarily turns on the intent of the party against whom it is 
asserted, estoppel focuses solely on the party’s conduct . . . .”). 
 164. Knorr, 836 A.2d at 799.  
 165. Erdman Co., 650 F.3d at 1117; 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:29 (4th ed.). 
 166. Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 391 (“Neither in its briefs nor at oral argument did Kraftmaid give any 
reason for its delay in filing the stay besides needing time ‘to weigh its options.’  That is the worst 
possible reason for delay . . . .  It wanted to play heads I win, tails you lose.”).  
 167. E.g., Erdman Co., 650 F.3d at 1117.  
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reliance, the majority view has adopted the traditional contract law notion of 
estoppel, which permits courts to avoid giving contracts their full effect when 
it would not be equitable.168  
Because the majority view has adopted this test from contract law and 
the minority view has not, only the majority view truly places the arbitration 
right on the same footing as all other contract rights.169  Therefore, it is 
incumbent on all the circuits to maintain or adopt the majority view on 
arbitration waiver because only this view is consistent with the FAA, which 
has been interpreted to require that the arbitration right be put on the same 
footing as all contract rights.170  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
As this note has discussed, in order for the arbitration right to be placed 
on the same footing as other contract rights, a court should require the non-
movant to prove that he has suffered some prejudice, such that the movant 
should be estopped from moving to stay the case, pending arbitration.171  
Note that, by enforcing arbitration like all other contract rights, society 
appreciates many benefits.172  Facilitating arbitration reduces the cost, and 
increases the efficiency, of dispute resolution.173 These reduced costs and 
increased efficiencies174, which often benefit businesses directly, may also 
flow to consumers in the form of lower prices and higher value. 
Despite these benefits, perhaps it is unfair for arbitration clauses to be 
treated the same as all other contractual clauses.175  For example, there are 
concerns that arbitrators may not be as unbiased as state and federal judges, 
and they may favor the business party over the consumer.176  This same 
concern applies to arbitration waiver as well, where it seems unfair that a 
party may bring a case to court “to weigh its options” and then move to stay 
the case pending arbitration.177  The Seventh Circuit has called this a game of 
“heads I win, tails you lose.”178 
                                                 
 168. Id.; 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:29 (4th ed.). 
 169. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 15-16; Erdman Co., 650 F.3d at 1117. 
 170. 9 U.S.C.A § 2 (West 2012); Southland, 465 U.S. at 15–16; Erdman Co., 650 F.3d at 1117. 
 171. 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:29 (4th ed.). 
 172. Spencer, supra note 4, at D1.  
 173. Id. 
 174. Id.  
 175. Editorial, supra note 6. 
 176. Id.   
 177. Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 178. Id.  
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Nevertheless, this line of reasoning ignores a very fundamental principal 
to American jurisprudence—freedom of contract.179  It is important to be 
mindful that arbitration is not being forced on the parties.180  Instead, the 
parties have voluntarily agreed to enter into a contract with a mandatory 
arbitration clause.181  In so doing, they have the power both to craft an 
arbitration clause in whatever way they see fit, or, at the very least, to refuse 
to enter into it.182  Their election to enter into a contract, rather than a court’s 
after-the-fact second-guessing, should generally signal its inherent fairness, 
absent evidence of fraud, duress, or coercion.183  
Furthermore, even in cases where a court finds after-the-fact that 
enforcement of a contract is unfair, contract law affords the court some 
latitude not to enforce the contract under the doctrine of estoppel.184  This 
doctrine, embodied in the majority approach’s prejudice requirement, is a 
workable test that should prevent any game of “heads I win, tails you 
lose.”185  
Courts, such as the Seventh Circuit, are not free to weaken the arbitration 
waiver test such that it does not comport with general contract law.186  
Eliminating the prejudice requirement has exactly that result.187  It places 
arbitration on a lesser footing than all other contract provisions.188  In the 
FAA, Congress decided to place arbitration on the same footing as all other 
                                                 
 179. See 16B AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 641 (2012) (discussing freedom of contract and how 
“courts will not limit this freedom to contract except under certain situations, such as the provision being 
against public policy, made under fraud or duress, and other considerations where the court in a legal 
proceeding has before it the unreasonableness of the contract provision”).  
 180. Id.  
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. (“The freedom of contract also entails the freedom not to contract.”).  This argument is 
particularly compelling in cases such as Southland and Cabinetree, where the parties were both 
businesses.  In contrast, where one of the parties is a consumer and the other is a business, it could be 
argued that the first power, the power to craft the agreement, is not present.  Of course, the second power, 
the power to refuse to enter the contract, remains.  
 183. 16B AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 641 (2012).   
 184. 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:29 (4th ed.). 
 185. Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1995); 13 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:29 (4th ed.).  In reality, the problem is not the prejudice requirement at 
all.  The real potential for abuse, which could create the “heads I win, tails you lose” situation, arises if 
courts fail to strictly apply the prejudice factors discussed in the text accompanying note 107.  See 
Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 391 (referring to “heads I win, tails you lose”).  However, courts adhering to the 
majority view do in fact apply these factors strictly.  For example, although the Fifth Circuit maintains 
“[a] presumption against waiver” and places “a heavy burden of proof” on the party asserting waiver, it 
acknowledges that “[a]ny attempt to go to the merits and to retain still the right to arbitration is clearly 
impermissible.” Petroleum Pipe Americas Corp. v. Jindal Saw, Ltd., 575 F.3d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(quotations omitted). 
 186. Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 391.   
 187. Id.  
 188. Id.   
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contract provisions.189  Only Congress, not the courts, is free to change this 
policy.190   
 
                                                 
 189. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 
(1924)). 
 190. Id.  The need for judicial restraint in this instance is particularly important because the FAA was 
passed to overturn a common law precedent against arbitration.   
